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Abstract  
This paper aims to investigate the cyclical changes in the wage structure of the United 
Kingdom over the period 1972-2002 using the General Household Survey (GHS). 
Wage structure of the UK shows a cyclical pattern, which may be from the different 
wage cyclicality of the top, middle and bottom percentile groups. Higher educated 
male workers have experienced a faster growth of the education premiums so that the 
wages of males have become more dispersed after the 1970s. However, female 
workers with only primary education have faster wage growth than higher educated 
ones. Moreover, the experience premiums of females have grown faster than males 
and become similar to males in recent years. Changes in the skill endowments and 
market valuation can account for the cyclical changes in female earnings structure 
over the entire period. The residual earnings inequality accounts for more than half 
changes in overall earnings inequality of males, which cannot be explained by 
changes in skill endowments and market returns. The evolution of the wage structure, 
including changes in gender gap, overall wage inequality, skill premiums as well as 
residual wage inequality are affected by business cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper endeavours to investigate the cyclical changes in the wage structure of the 
United Kingdom using the historical data of the General Household Survey (GHS) 
1972-2002. Wage inequality in the United Kingdom has increased substantially since 
the 1970s and arrived at a high level in terms of either the UK’s own historical 
experience or by comparison with other European countries in the early years of the 
new century. The change pattern and determination of inequality always draw the 
attention of economists and common public, so the evolution of the wage structure 
over the 1980s and the early 1990s has been well documented by a number of papers. 
For example, Schmitt (1995) uses the GHS 1974-1988 to describe how earnings 
inequality among males fell slightly during the 1970s, only to rise rapidly in the 1980s 
in the UK. Gosling et al. (2000) report that the gap between the 90
th
 and 10
th
 
percentile of the wage distribution changed little during the 1960s and early 1970s and 
has widened rapidly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s using the GHS 1978-1991 
and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1978-1995. Dickens (2000) reports a 
doubling of the variance of the logarithm of hourly wages during the same period 
using the New Earnings Survey (NES) 1975-1995.  
More recent literature continues the story. Gosling and Lemieux (2001) report 
that wage inequality in the UK remained more stable in the second half of the 1990’s 
mainly using the FES 1978-1996, supplemented with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
1997-1999. Prasad (2002) studies the NES and discusses wage inequality from 1975 
to 1999. He argues that there has been virtually no change in wage inequality of the 
UK in the latter half of the 1990s. Kalwij and Alessie (2007) confirm the above 
observation by examining the variance-covariance structure of log-wages of British 
men in the NES 1975-2001. They also find that wage inequality has risen sharply 
during the 1980s and early 1990s and remained fairly constant in the second half of 
the 1990s. A strong increase in transitory wage inequality and a lesser increase in 
permanent wage inequality are the main causes of the worsening wage inequality 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. They attribute the stable wage inequality in the 
second half of the 1990s to the stabilization of permanent and transitory wages 
inequality, especially the strong decrease in the transitory wage inequality for the new 
entrants. Thus, current research is in sharp contrast to earlier literature and illuminates 
the “mild miracle” of the British economy in the last 10 years of last century which 
had low unemployment, strong money, faster growth of GDP and improved earnings 
inequality.  
Many researchers compare changes of the wage structure in the UK with other 
OECD countries, especially the United States and continental European countries. In 
these respects, wage inequality in the British labour market shows similar trends to 
that in the US. Although other industrialised countries have experienced the same 
changes in global economy over the last decades, the increase of wage inequality is 
much less pronounced than in the UK and the US. Continental European countries 
such as Italy, Germany, France and Scandinavia are even absent from the worsening 
process of wage inequality during the 1980s (Katz et al., 1995; Blau and Kahn, 1996; 
Gosling and Lemieux, 2001). This cross-national research attributes the similarity in 
the US and UK to the convergence of “US-style” reform in British labour market 
institutions, in contrast to the rigid labour market in continental Europe. Therefore, 
understanding the evolution of wage structure is the first step to consider those 
important issues such as earnings inequality, unemployment and labour market 
flexibility in the UK. 
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The aim of this paper is to analyse a long time series of the wage structure of 
the UK. It can be treated as an updating of Schmitt (1995) and Katz et al. (1995). Our 
research indicates that the British wage structure has dramatically changed since the 
1970s. Wage inequality in the UK has shown a cyclical pattern over the period of 
1972-2002, which fell slightly in the 1970s, and then rose rapidly in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. This increasing trend has been effectively contained in the late 1990s and 
early years of 2000s. Moreover, the movement of the skill (education and experience) 
premium fits the change of wage inequality very well. The similar cyclical evolution 
of skill premiums over the three decades in the UK is examined and analysed in this 
paper. Another contribution is that we apply the same analysis not only on males but 
also females which are ignored by many researchers, as a reflection of the 
increasingly important role of women in terms of workforce participation. The 
remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main data 
sources. Section 3 examines the changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality 
in the UK over the period 1972-2002. In section 4, we apply a standard earnings 
equation to check the changes of skill premium. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
2.1 Demographic trends in the GHS 
The principle data in this paper come from the series of the annual General Household 
Survey (GHS) from 1972 to 2002. The GHS is a continuous multipurpose survey of 
large random samples of households across Great Britain, conducted on an annual 
basis by the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2004). The survey has been carried 
out continuously except for two breaks in 1997 when the survey was reviewed and 
1999 when the survey was redeveloped. Hence, there are 29 years of data over the 
total 31 years of 1972-2002.
1
 
The GHS include about 13,000 households in each year, that is, about 16,000 
adults aged 16 and over in England, Scotland and Wales. Data are collected on five 
core topics including education, employment, health, housing, and population and 
family information. These surveys provide individual information on wages and 
employment for 337,836 workers during the period 1972-2002. Hence, each of the 29 
annual GHS included in the analysis covers about 12,000 males and females with 
wage and employment information. Other variables such as education and working 
hours are also covered in a continuous way. The GHS datasets are reasonably 
consistent over time for wage variables of workers with age, gender, education and 
other demographic characteristics and thus provides consistent and nationally 
representative information on individuals.  
 
(Table 1 around here) 
 
We use three demographic characteristics: gender, education and potential 
labour market experience (simplified as experience for further analysis) to categorize 
our sample. The education variables used in this thesis are based on the highest 
educational qualification earned by the respondent, which is either vocational or 
academic. Schmitt (1995) argues that the use of qualification-based variables in the 
                                                 
1
The General Household Survey 1972-2002 is distributed by the Economic and Social Data Service, 
Office of National Statistics (ONS). Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of the 
Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. For a detailed description of the GHS, visit 
the website of ONS: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase or the GHS home of Economic and Social 
Data Service (ESDS government) http://www.esds.ac.uk/government/ghs/. 
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GHS offers two advantages over education measures based on years of schooling. 
First, the qualification variables outperform schooling years in standard human capital 
equations (Schmitt, 1991). Second, the value of different types of qualifications, 
particularly vocational as opposed to academic qualifications, may shed new light on 
the workings of the supply and demand for skills than an undifferentiated 
schooling-year variable. In order to simplify the complicated structure of British 
qualifications, all highest qualifications earned by the respondent are categorized into 
six groups: NOQUAL, BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE. The complete 
list and brief description of education variables are presented in the Table 1a, and the 
recoding process of six education groups in the GHS 1972-2002 is presented in the 
Table 1b. 
Since 1973, all British children have had to attend full-time education until the 
age of sixteen. Those who have never gone to school and who have never earned a 
qualification consist of the group of workers without qualifications (NOQUAL). 
According to the GHS, NOQUAL was the largest group in the total employment 
before 1994 (for example, about 61.5 percent in 1972). This group has decreased 
rapidly over the last thirty years so that only about 15 percent of workers had no 
qualifications in 2002, as shown in Panel A of Figure 1.  
Those who earn qualifications follow either a vocational or an academic track. 
Following Schmitt (1995), the vocational qualifications increase in skill from 
miscellaneous, relatively low-skilled apprenticeships (VOC-OTHER) through 
incremented, nationally recognized apprenticeships (VOC-LOW, VOC-MIDDLE, and 
VOC-HIGH). The highest level vocational qualifications can involve some instruction 
at college level.
2
 School children following the academic track prepare for and sit a 
series of national tests by academic subject. Those who finally earn the lowest 
academic (below O-LEVEL) or vocational qualifications (VOC-OTHER) are 
categorized into the BOLEV group. The BOLEV group also decreased from about 14 
percent in 1972 to 11 percent in 2002 in Panel A of Figure 1. 
Students passing grades on a series of national tests by academic subject, 
generally taken around age 16, may earn qualifications that would place individuals in 
the OLEVEL 1-4, O-LEV&CLER, and O-LEVEL 5+ categories. The “Ordinary 
Level” examination categories distinguish between students who pass between one 
and four examinations, and those who attempt and pass five or more. The distinction 
is important for some employers and for further study. Workers with these O-LEVEL 
equivalent or VOC-LOW qualifications are categorized into the OLEV group, which 
increased from about 10 percent in 1972 to about 20 percent in 2002 in Panel A of 
Figure 1.    
After O-LEVEL, some students (usually around age 18) take further national 
examinations at “Advanced level”. For some students, A-LEVEL is a terminal 
qualification; for others they are only a prerequisite for university admission. Workers 
with these A-LEVEL equivalent or VOC-MIDDLE qualifications are categorized into 
the ALEV group. The ALEV group has increased five-fold from about 4 percent to 19 
percent over the entire period.  
The remaining two education groups have also increased over the last thirty 
years. The HIGHER group includes college equivalent qualifications, which consist of 
all educational or professional qualifications below degree level but above GCE 
                                                 
2
 Works generally earn vocational qualifications while they work, through apprenticeship schemes, 
part-time study, or relatively short periods of full-time study “sandwiched” between spells of 
employment, often with the same employer. Thus, we involve company training (if with qualifications) 
in this education variable. 
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A-level (For example, Teaching, Nursing and VOC-HIGH). The employment share of 
the higher education group (HIGHER, about 10 percent in 2002) has doubled in the 
last thirty years. The DEGREE group here includes all respondents who successfully 
finished the standard three-year university course as well as those who study further. 
In particular, the employment share of the DEGREE group has increased about 
nine-fold from 2.7 percent to 22 percent over the period 1972-2002. Thus, the 
employment composition has shifted to a more educated (skilled) structure, revealing 
the dramatic changes of skill supply in the British labour market.  
 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
The experience variable is defined in the standard way as the minimum of 
(age-years of education-5, age-16).
3
 This assumes that all workers should enter 
education at the age of five and cannot leave school before they are sixteen years old. 
Observations are categorized into eight groups, each covering five years of experience. 
Card and Lemieux (2001) argue that the United Kingdom experienced a baby boom in 
the 1950s and the falling supply of college graduate in this cohort may raise the 
earnings returns of college degrees for the young in the 1980s. Daveri and Maliranta 
(2007) also reveal the impact of age and seniority on wages and productivity in 
Finland. More British people are staying longer in the workforce so common practice 
of excluding experience over 40s may be introducing biases. Thus, workers with more 
than 40-year experience are also put into the last experience group.  
In Panel B of Figure 1, the employment share of new entrants (with 0-10 years 
of experience) was quite stable in the 1970s and decreased from about 25 percent to 
about 19 percent during the 1980s and early years of the 1990s. At the same time, the 
employment share of prime experienced workers (with 21-30 years of experience) had 
continuously increased from about 20 percent to about 27 percent. Just as in other 
developed countries such as the US and Canada, the evolution of experience structure 
in Britain reflects a baby boom in the 1950s (Card and Lemieux, 2001) and the long 
term aging process of the workforce. Thus, higher employment shares of prime 
experienced workers reflect a slight shift to the more experienced structure in the 
British labour market. 
 
2.2 Wage variables in the GHS 
The wage variable used in this paper is the real gross hourly earnings, deflated by the 
annual Retail Price Index (RPI) with 1995 as 100. This deflating factor is calculated 
from the prices of all items excluding mortgage interest payments provided by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS). The wage variable is from a wage sample 
including all full-time employees aged sixteen to sixty-six.
 “Full time employee” here 
is defined as workers (excluding employer and self-employed) with weekly working 
hours exceeding 35 hours. Self-employed workers, part time workers and those 
working without pay are excluded from the sample. Our variables for earnings are all 
calculated from the wage sample which provides accurate wage information and 
exclude extreme cases of earnings. 
 
(Table 2 around here) 
 
                                                 
3
 See Katz and Murphy (1992).  
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The complete list and a description of the earnings variables are presented in 
Table 2. This hourly wage variable is derived as follows. Firstly, gross earnings 
before any deduction are divided by the corresponding payment period (weeks). 
Schmitt (1995) also thinks the real gross weekly wage is the most continuous measure 
of the unit price of labour input in the GHS. Secondly, real weekly earnings are 
divided by weekly working hours (workhrs) to calculate real hourly earnings. 
According to the ONS (2006), before 1996, workhrs gives the “Usual number of 
hours worked per week excluding mealtime and overtime”. But, after 1996, this 
variable includes mealtime and overtime. Figure 2 describes changes of the weekly 
working hours by gender. The left vertical axis represents the mean working hours for 
all full-time workers, males and females. The right vertical axis represents the 
working hours gap between males and females. We can find weekly working hours of 
all three groups are quite stable over the entire period. Full time males work longer 
time, about 42 hours per week than females (about 39 hours per week). Moreover, the 
working hours gender gap has been slowly increasing after the 1970s, from about 2 
hours in 1980 to about 4 hours in 2002. Since the working hour variable before 1996 
does not include over time, our hourly earnings variable may be affected by the 
different coverage of the weekly earnings variable and working hour variables in the 
GHS.  
 
(Figure 2 around here) 
 
The main concern about our wage variable is likely to be the measurement of 
overtime working hours. The overtime working hours are commonly regarded as 
short-term employment adjustment mechanism that enables firms to meet unexpected 
variations in demand without incurring the fixed costs of hiring or firing workers (Bils, 
1987). Bell et al. (2000) find that a significant number of employees work more hours 
in the workplace than their contract stipulates. The overtime working is an important 
part of working hours in the British labour market and the quantitative significance of 
both paid and unpaid overtime is even greater in the UK (than in Germany).
4
 The 
missing overtime problem in weekly working hours may bring upwards biases in the 
levels of hourly wage rates calculated from weekly earnings divided by weekly 
working hours as in this paper, which also could bring counter-cyclical biases for the 
changes of hourly wage over business cycle if the weekly overtime is also 
counter-cyclical (Peng and Siebert, 2012).  
Bell and Hart (2003a) show that without national laws regulating overtime 
assignment or compensation, British overtime wage premiums are actually 
independent of overtime hours, and the proportions of overtime workers working at 
given rates are very similar across the worker groups with different working hours. 
Moreover, Bell and Hart (2003b) argue that overtime hours and pay are not wholly 
geared to meet short-term shifts in production requirements even in labour markets 
like Britain where statutory overtime rules do not apply. The maximum lengths of 
standard weekly hours set by many firms follow wider industrial or regional or 
national collective bargaining norms. These observations are consistent with the view 
that the conditions for overtime working follow “custom and practice” and a 
long-term contractual role for overtime, suggesting that the effect of overtime 
working in our hourly earnings could be stable over time (Bell and Hart, 2003a). 
                                                 
4
 Bell and Hart (2003a) find that about 35% of total male workers and 18% of women in the 1998 NES 
sample worked overtime. Of the non-managerial men they studied, 49% worked overtime.  
 7 
Therefore, the missing overtime in our working hours variable can be regarded 
a time-invariant factor which would not affect our argument on cyclical changes of 
wage structure. Hourly wage used in this paper can exclude the cyclical effect of 
working hours from earnings variable hence be a more accurate measurement than 
weekly earnings.
5
 
 
3. Changes in Wage Structure 
3.1 Gender gap 
We firstly present a broad empirical characterization of the evolution of the wage 
structure in the UK during the period 1972-2002. Figure 3 describes changes of the 
real hourly wages by gender. The left vertical axis represents the log form mean wage 
for all full time workers, and for males and females. The right vertical axis represents 
the wage gap between males and females. We can see that over the entire period, the 
real hourly wage of all full time workers increases by about 60 percent (from 1.46 in 
1972 to 2.06 in 2002).
6
 Since about two thirds of the full time workers are males, the 
mean wage of males has increased by a similar magnitude as the full work force, that 
is, 50 percent over the entire period (from 1.61 in 1972 to 2.11 in 2002).  
 
(Figure 3 around here) 
 
At the same time, Figure 3 indicates that the mean wage of females has 
increased by about 90 percent over the thirty years (from 1.06 in 1972 to 1.96 in 
2002). This result suggests that the gender gap between males and females has 
decreased by about 40 percent (=90-50). In 1972, full time males earned about 55 
percent (=1.65-1.10) more than females, while wage gap decreased to less than 40 
percent in 1980, and then to only 16 percent (=2.10-1.94) in 2002.
7
 Since the wage 
gap between males and females has been decreasing over the last three decades, the 
narrowing gender gap should decrease overall earnings inequality. Thus, the well 
documented rising earnings inequality in the UK must be from the worsening 
inequality within rather than between gender groups.  
 
3.2 Wage inequality within gender group 
In order to illustrate the rising inequality within each gender group, Panel A of Figure 
4 summarizes movements of wage inequality by gender. It plots the times series of 
wage inequality for males and females measured as the log wage differentials between 
the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles of the wage distribution. Overall hourly wage 
inequality (90
th
-10
th
 percentile differentials) has increased by about 25 percent (from 
about 1.0 in 1972 to about 1.25 in 2002) for males as well as by about 13 percent 
                                                 
5
 The main conclusions do not change as we test the sensitivity of our results by replacing hourly wage 
with weekly earnings. In particular, the cyclical patterns of labour demand are still prominent using 
weekly earnings. It suggests that the overtime part of the weekly working hours be time-invariant (or 
rigid) as discussed in Bell and Hart (2003a, 2003b).   
6
 We refer to 100 times log changes as percentage changes. 
7
 GHS oversampled married women in the early years so reduction in the wage gap might also reflect 
this sampling bias. The GHS Summary Quality Report from ONS (2007a) also admits: “one of the 
limitations of the GHS is that the nature of the sample design means that the precision of survey 
estimates is reduced ……Although this effect is reduced by the use of stratification it is nevertheless a 
limitation of the survey.” However, we find that the ratio of married women is quite stable in our 
sample during the period 1972-1995. Thus, the oversample of married women would not affect our 
basic results.  
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(from about 1.0 in 1972 to about 1.13 in 2002) for females over the entire period. 
Moreover, with this long term increasing trend, wage inequality in the UK follows a 
cyclical pattern over the entire period. The figure shows earnings inequality narrowed 
in the 1970s, especially for females, and moved up until the early years of the 1990s. 
After 1995, the rising trend of earnings inequality was definitely reduced for females 
and kept quite stable for males. This graph is consistent with results of Prasad (2002).  
We use the national unemployment rate of males as an indicator of business 
cycle, which is derived from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) (ONS, 2007b). Panel A 
of Figure 4 shows that the earnings inequality increases as the labour market becomes 
loose, vice versa. It suggests that the earnings inequality would increase with 
increasing unemployment rates, as well as decrease with decreasing unemployment 
rates. This counter-cyclical phenomenon is even more prominent for females than for 
males. Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006) find the similar counter-cyclical pattern of 
earnings inequality using data of the first half of the 20th century. They argue that 
recessions should contribute more to raising inequality when inequality is rising over 
the long run than when it is falling. During the 1970s and years after mid-1990s, we 
find the increasing unemployment (recession) has no much effect on the falling 
inequality. However, during the 1980s and early years of 1990s, the rising inequality 
is more sensitive to the recessions. Our findings in Panel A are consistent with their 
model.   
 
(Figure 4 around here) 
 
Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006) also point out that cyclical fluctuation affects 
workers at different locations of earnings distribution in different ways, and ultimately 
shaping the distribution of earnings over the business cycle. Panel B of Figure 4 
illustrates this image by plotting the cumulative log real wage growth of three groups 
- the tenth, fiftieth, and ninetieth percentiles of the wage distribution - for males. More 
precisely, the figure displays the log ratio of each group’s real hourly earnings in each 
year relative to that group’s level of real earnings in 1972 (the baseline year), and 
gives us a snapshot of the movement in earnings of the three groups.  
In Panel B of Figure 4, recessions in business cycle correspond to periods of 
rising unemployment and dropping wages, so all three groups show procyclical wages, 
in line with micro evidence from the past thirty years of the UK (Devereux and Hart, 
2006; Devereux and Hart, 2007; Peng and Siebert, 2012) and the USA (Shin and 
Solon, 2007). However, wages of the top percentile group are more sensitive to the 
recovery of business cycle and increase much faster than the middle and bottom 
percentile group during the 1980s and early years of the 1990s. Wages of the poor 
group have achieved the least growth (only about 42 percent) among the three groups 
over the entire period, and then the middle group (about 48 percent), while the wages 
of the rich group have grown fastest (about 62 percent). Hence, the rich have grown 
richer at faster pace than the poor in the last thirty years and ultimately reshape the 
earnings distribution. 
Responding to the two big unemployment shock around the early years of the 
1980s and the 1990s (Berthoud, 2007), wages of the rich group showed very high 
procyclicality and recovered from the shock very quickly. Brewer et al. (2008) 
investigate two different sources of data – the Households Below Average Income 
data-set (HBAI) and the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI), and also find that the rich 
have grown richer at faster pace than most workers and their incomes may have 
accelerated even further in years on the back of a rising stock market. They argue that 
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with so many working in finance, there is a strong link between fortunes of the rich 
group and those of the stock market. Similarly, the graph of the 90
th
 percentile in 
Panel B maintained high speed over the entire period, maybe due to the ICT booming 
in production (O'Mahony et al., 2008) and the “dot-com bubble” in financial market 
covering roughly 1995–2001 (Goldfarb et al., 2007). Hence, wage of the rich group is 
not only following a long term increasing trend but also highly procyclical to business 
fluctuation.  
Wages of the middle and poor groups also show overall procyclical pattern 
over time. However, wages of the poor group are not so sensitive as the middle and 
rich groups to the business recovery around the mid-1980s. Hence, wages of the poor 
group had been left behind further by the other two groups during the big 
unemployment shock around the mid-1980s. With the decline of trade union’s 
collective bargaining (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010), wages of the poor group 
become more sensitive to business cycle during the 1990s and the 2000s and increase 
very fast after the unemployment shock of the mid-1990s. This time, it is wages of the 
middle group that are sticky and insensitive to the business recovery. This result is 
consistent with the findings of O’Mahony et al. (2008) that the intermediate skill 
groups became more disadvantageous in the 1990s than in the 1980s. O’Mahony et al. 
(2008) also find an increasing complementarity between capital and unskilled labour 
in the 1990s. Thus, with help of better adaptation for technology in the 1990s, the 
earnings of the poor group converged to the middle group quickly over the last years 
in our sample.  
 
4. A standard earnings equation 
4.1 Evolution of the skill premium 
Next, we apply a standard earnings equation to do repeated cross-section regressions. 
Workers’ educational qualifications and experience are used as skill proxies to 
analyse the evolution of skill premiums over time. Moreover, we also estimate 
residual wages after these repeated cross-section regressions. Residual wage 
inequality is the dispersion of wages after controlling for the measured 
supply-demand changes of skill groups. Thus, residual inequality is the part of overall 
inequality unexplained by measurable skill variables such as education and 
experience.  
Hourly earnings are estimated for males and females in a repeated 
cross-section regression as in Katz et al. (1995): 
 
lnwi = a + b1Qi + b2 Expi + b3 Expi
2
 + b4Ri +b5Wi+b6Mi +b7 Tt +ei              (1) 
 
The dependent variable lnwi is log form real gross hourly pay. Explanatory variables 
include a vector of five education dummies Qi: BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and 
DEGREE (NOQUAL as the baseline group); the quadratic experience terms (Exp and 
Exp
2
) to capture the concavity of the experience earnings profile, a vector of four 
region dummies Ri: MIDLAND, SOUTH, WALES and SCOTLAND (Northern England 
as the baseline group), an ethnicity dummy set as 1 for white people (Wi), a marital 
status dummy set as 1 married people (Mi) and a vector of year dummies Tt only for 
pooled datasets; ei is an error term.  
Table 3 presents estimated coefficients for males and females using the pooled 
datasets of six periods: 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-91, 1992-96 and 1998-2002. 
The education premiums are represented as the estimated coefficients of the education 
dummies in equation (1). Higher educated workers have a higher level of education 
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premiums for both males and females in each period. For instance, during the period 
1998-2002, males in the DEGREE group earn about 68.1 percent more than males in 
the NOQUAL group, while males in the BOLEV group only earn about 8.7 percent 
more than the NOQUAL group. The highest return from education is for the DEGREE 
group, which is about 30 percent higher than the second highest educated group 
(HIGHER) for both males and females. Hence, more education brings higher earnings. 
And, degrees from university are the most important education qualification for 
earnings. This result is consistent with the considerable existing literature on 
education return e.g. Harmon, Hogan and Walker Harmon et al. (2003b), Harmon, 
Oosterbeek and Walker (2003a) and Walker and Zhu (2003; 2005).
8
 
Education premiums in Table 3 have shown a cyclical pattern with an 
increasing trend over the entire period for males, but this increasing trend is more 
evident after the 1970s.
9
 Moreover, the more educated are male workers, the faster do 
their education premiums grow after the 1970s. This clear ranking in education 
premium growth after the 1970s is as follows: 12.1 percent for DEGREE 
(=0.681-0.560), 4.1 percent for HIGHER (=0.4-0.359), about 2 percent for ALEV and 
OLEV, and no much change for BOLEV. Those males who are more educated seem to 
have faster wage growth. Consequently, the more dispersed education premiums have 
pushed up male wage inequality since the 1970s.  
Females in Table 3 also show that the large earnings premium is associated 
with more education. And, education premiums of females are higher than those of 
males (Walker and Zhu, 2003). However, females’ education premiums are more 
stable and cyclical than males. And, primary education (BOLEV and OLEV) are much 
more important for females’ earnings than for males’. For example, wages of females 
in the BOLEV group have increased by about 3.08 percent (=0.1517-0.1208) as well 
as about 5 percent (=0.228-0.1822) in the OLEV group since the 1970s. Earnings 
premiums of higher educated groups (ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE) have not 
changed much over the entire period.  
Therefore, we find the earnings premiums of all education groups have been 
increasing, at least stable after the 1970s for both males and females. With recent 
rapid expansion of high education (see Figure 1), our results suggest that the increased 
supply of graduates has been absorbed by the labour market, implying that the 
demand for skills has overwhelmed the supply of skills, at least increased roughly in 
tandem in recent two decades. Our findings are consistent with Harmon, Hogan and 
Walker (2003b) and Walker and Zhu (2005) using different data sources. 
The coefficients of quadratic experience are reported in the next four rows in 
Table 3. Similar to education premiums, there is also an increasing trend of the 
experience premiums for both males and females over the entire period (especially 
after the 1970s). Moreover, the females’ experience premiums increase much faster 
than males’. As can be seen, the experience premiums of females increase from 3.56 
percent in the period 1972-1976 to 4.59 percent in the period 1998-2002, while the 
experience premiums of males only increase from 4.32 to 4.58 percent.  
                                                 
8
 For example, Walker and Zhu (2003) demonstrate, mainly using the Labour Force Survey (LFS), that 
there is a large earnings premium associated with more education – perhaps as much as 10 per cent per 
additional year of education. 
9
Repeated cross section regressions do not account for influence of overall pattern of the business cycle 
on wage earnings, which might cause misspecification problem in our regression. Solon et al. (1994)  
and Devereux and Hart (2006) have used the standard two step method to capture the effect of business 
cycle.   
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Considering the quadratic effect of experience, and controlling for other 
variables, a female worker with 10 years of experience would earn about 28.6 percent 
(=3.56×10-0.07×100) more than a new entrant in the period 1972-1976, while she 
would earn about 36.9 percent (=4.59×10-0.09×100) more in the period 1998-2002. 
However, there is no such dramatic increase in the experience premiums of males. 
Thus, the experience premiums of females have grown faster than males and become 
similar to males in recent years. 
 
(Table 3 around here) 
 
Our regressions also show some other points worthy of mention. Firstly, 
regional premium is only prominent for the south of England (including the Great 
London area), which increases from 6.77 percent to 16.01 percent for males, and from 
11.56 percent to 16.43 percent for females over the last thirty years. For other regions, 
there is no continuous significant regional premium compared with the north of 
England. Hence, only the south of England (including the Great London area) is 
different from other regions and the wage gap between the south of England and 
others is becoming wider, showing it is becoming the most prosperous area in the UK.  
Secondly, ethnicity is important for males but not for females (especially in 
the 1970s and 1980s). Married males earn more than unmarried, while married 
females may earn a little less, but not significant. Obviously, these control variables 
contribute little to changes of wage structure (and the increasing earnings inequality). 
The main measurable variables to explain the higher earnings inequality are skills, i.e. 
education attainment and its earnings premium (Gosling et al., 2000; Harmon et al., 
2003a).  
Finally, R-squared values in Table 3 decrease from 36.95 percent in 1972-76 
to 19.26 percent in 1998-2002 for males. Much literature also shows that measured 
characteristics (gender, education and experience) of workers can only explain about 
thirty percent of wage variations (Katz et al., 1995). The declining explanatory power 
of measured characteristics may reflect the inaccuracy of educational qualifications as 
an approximation of human capital. For instance, Nickell and Bell (1996) argue that 
primary education quality in the UK has declined, which may decrease the 
explanatory power of primary education. Since educational qualifications are 
imperfect proxies of human capital, wage variations from policy changes or other 
unmeasured characteristics such as ability or education quality are reflected in the 
residuals of equation (1).  
 
4.2 Residual wage inequality 
We now do the repeated cross-section regressions for each year. After controlling for 
the characteristics of workers, the distribution of residuals from these regressions may 
be thought of as capturing the dispersion of wage unexplained by the supply and 
demand framework. The Panel A of Figure 5 plots the 90
th
-10
th
 percentile differentials 
of residual earnings for males and females and shows a very similar cyclical pattern to 
the overall inequality in Figure 4. The recessions around the 1980s and 1990s would 
contribute to raising residual inequality, while the recovery around the year of 1990 
and the 2000s dramatically decrease residual inequality. Our results show that, after 
controlling for skills (and their cyclicality), residual inequality is still affected by 
business cycle.  
Moreover, if the increase in overall inequality were due solely to rising 
inequality between education-experience groups, we would expect the residual 
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distribution to show no tendency toward greater inequality. The overall inequality 
would only stem from changing skill endowments or market valuations of human 
capital that the earnings regressions would remove from the data (Schmitt, 1995). The 
Panel A of Figure 5 seems supportive to Schmitt (1995)’s argument. For example, the 
residual inequality of females only shows a cyclical movement without tendency 
toward greater inequality over the entire period (around 0.9 in 1972 and 2002). During 
which the overall inequality has increased by 13 percent over the same period (see 
Panel A of Figure 4). Hence, changes in the skill endowments and market valuation 
can fully account for the changes in female earnings inequality over the entire period.  
For males, the residual inequality has increased by only 14 percent from 1972 
(0.83) to 2002 (0.97), compared with 25 percent in the overall inequality (from about 
1.0 in 1972 to about 1.25 in 2002, see Panel A of Figure 4). By this crude measure, 
changes in the skill endowments and market valuation can account for about 44 
percent i.e. (25-14)/25 of the changes in male earnings inequality over the entire 
period. Hence, for males, approximately 56 percent (=14/25) of the increase of overall 
earnings inequality has occurred within education and experience groups. This result 
is very similar to Schmitt (1995) who claims that about 60 percent of the increase of 
earnings inequality occurred within education and experience groups in the period 
1978-1988. Therefore, the residual inequality of males shows a cyclical movement 
with a much less increasing tendency toward greater inequality over the entire 
period.
10
 
 
(Figure 5 around here) 
 
Panel B of Figure 5 plots the cumulative growth of the tenth, fiftieth, and 
ninetieth percentiles of males’ residual wage. The residual wages of three groups 
show different sensitiveness to shocks from business cycle, which decides the 
evolution of residual wage inequality. Firstly, the residual wages of the middle group 
(or semi-skilled workers) are quite stable around zero and insensitive to shocks from 
business cycle before 1990. Furthermore, the jump of residual wages around the 
mid-1990s even shows a counter-cyclical pattern, which may be associated with 
disadvantage of semi-skilled workers in capital complementarity in the 1990s 
(O'Mahony et al., 2008). Hence, compared with the middle group in Figure 4, wage 
procyclicality with the increasing trend of the middle group has been represented by 
changes in skill endowments and market valuation. 
Secondly, the residual wages of the poor group are also quite stable around 
zero and insensitive to business cycle during the 1970s and the 1980s. However, after 
1990, their residual wages show high procyclicality and become very sensitive to the 
recovery of business cycle. Hence, the tenth percentile of residual wages increases 
very fast and quickly converges to the middle group in the last ten years of our sample. 
                                                 
10
The increasing residual or within earnings inequality is a widely observed phenomenon in the USA 
and UK (Katz et al., 1995). Rosen (1981) pioneers the economics of superstars and argues that the 
standard competitive model is virtually silent about any special role played by either the size of the 
total market or the amount of it controlled by few people. MacDonald (1988) emphasises that the 
young in occupations such as acting and finance earn well below what their current alternative offers, 
and success is rare and rewarded highly in these occupations (Brewer et al., 2008). Even with the same 
skill qualifications, most young participants will not become superstars in these occupations and are 
paid less than their peers in other occupations at least, which presumably increases the within earnings 
inequality. 
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This result is consistent with O’Mahony et al. (2008) which find an increasing 
complementarity between capital and unskilled labour in the 1990s. 
Finally, the residual wages of the rich group only show an increasing trend 
without clear cyclicality. Hence, the 90
th
-50
th
 percentile differentials of residual wages 
have been increasing after the 1970s. Compared with the rich group in Figure 2.4, 
wage procyclicality and its partial increasing trend of the rich group have been 
represented by changes in skill endowments and market valuation. Thus, the 
increasing residual wage inequality of males is mainly from the increasing trend of the 
rich group, which cannot be explained by changes in skill endowments and premiums.   
 
5. Conclusions  
Through a standard earnings equation, we do repeated cross-section regressions for 
real wages of males and females. We find that the overall real hourly wage has 
increased by about 60 percent in the UK from 1972 to 2002. Gender premiums have 
been decreasing over the last thirty years. Wages of females increase by 40 percent 
relative to the wages of males. Although narrowing gender gap is good for alleviation 
of wage inequality, wage inequality within gender group have been increasing. 
Overall hourly wage inequality (90
th
-10
th
 percentile differentials) increased by about 
25 percent for males as well as by about 13 percent for females over the entire period.  
Moreover, wage inequality shows a cyclical pattern, which may be from the 
different wage cyclicality of the top, middle and bottom percentile groups. These 
changes of wage inequality can be explained by the changes of skill (education and 
experience) premiums. The education premiums of males also show a cyclical pattern 
with somewhat increasing trend, especially after the 1970s. Higher educated male 
workers have experienced a faster growth of the education premiums so that the 
wages of males have become more dispersed after the 1970s. However, female 
workers with only primary education have faster wage growth than higher educated 
ones.  Moreover, the experience premiums of females have grown faster than males 
and become similar to males in recent years. 
Therefore, changes in the skill endowments and market valuation can fully 
account for the changes in female earnings inequality over the entire period. However, 
the residual earnings inequality accounts for about 56 percent of changes in overall 
earnings inequality of males, which cannot be explained by changes in skill 
endowments and market returns. The evolution of the wage structure, including 
changes in gender gap, overall wage inequality, skill premiums as well as residual 
wage inequality are induced not only by business cycle, but also by different type of 
technological changes and institution evolution. Our results demand further analysis 
on labour market performance with those underpinning forces.   
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Figure 1: Relative skill shares in total employment  
 
 
Sources: General Household Surveys 1972-2002. All numbers are from the males and females aged 
16-66. Except the first and last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 2: Mean working hours changes by gender, GHS 1972-2002
 
Sources: General Household Surveys 1972-2002. All numbers are from the full-time workers aged 
16-66 (workhrs>35). Except the first and last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
 
Figure 3: Mean wage changes by gender, GHS 1972-2002 
 
Note: The numbers in the figure represent log hourly wages using data from the General Household 
Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were not 
self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and last 
years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 4: Wage inequalities in the UK, GHS 1972-2002 
  
  
Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in hourly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Figure 5: Residual wage inequalities in the UK, GHS 1972-2002 
 
 
Note: The numbers in the figure represent log changes in hourly wages using data from the General 
Household Surveys, 1972-2002. Wage samples include full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were 
not self-employed and all earnings numbers are deflated based on 1995 pounds.  Except the first and 
last years (1972 and 2002), all points are three-year averages. 
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Table 1a: Education qualification variables in the GHS 1972-2002 
Variable Description 
NOQUAL NOQUAL includes: Without any qualification or never attended school. 
Below 
O-LEVEL 
Below O-LEVEL includes: 
CLERICAL: Commerce and clerical qualification without O-levels; 
 
OTHER : CSE grade 2-5 and CSE below grade 1, GCSE below grade c, O-level 
degraded, SCE degraded, plus all remaining qualifications, which consist mainly 
of local or regional school-leaving certificates and college or professional awards 
no regarded as “ higher educational”, i.e. not above GCE A-level or O-level 
standard; 
 
FOREIGN: foreign qualification; etc. 
 
VOC-OTHER: Miscellaneous apprenticeships; 
 
O-LEVEL O-LEVEL includes: 
O-LEVEL 5+ and equivalent: Five or more subjects at GCE O-level obtained 
before 1975 or in grades A-C if obtained later, five or more subjects at SCE 
Ordinary obtained before 1973 or in bands A-C if obtained later, five or more 
subjects at CSE grade 1 or at School Certificate, SLC Lower, or SUPE Lower; 
 
O-LEVEL 1-4 and equivalent: Less than five O-LEVELS with or without clerical 
or commercial qualification such as typing, shorthand, bookkeeping, commerce 
etc; 
 
VOC-LOW: City and Guilds Craft or Ordinary etc; 
A-LEVEL A-LEVEL and equivalent includes: 
GCE A-level in one, two or more subjects, 
 
Scottish Leaving Certificate (SLC), Scottish Certificate of Education (SCE), 
Scottish University Preliminary Examination (SUPE) at Higher Grade, Certificate 
of Sixth Year Studies; 
 
VOC-MIDDLE: 
City and Guilds Advanced or Final, Ordinary National Certificate (ONC) or 
Diploma (OND), BEC/TEC National, General, or Ordinary etc. 
HIGHER  
EDUCATION 
HIGHER EDUCATION includes: 
TEACHING: Non-graduate teaching qualifications (Census Level C); 
 
NURSING: Nursing qualifications (e.g. SEN,SRN,SCM); 
 
VOC-HIGH: 
HND and equivalent: Higher National Diploma [HND]/Higher National 
Certificate [HNC], BEC/TEC Higher Certificate or Higher Diploma; City and 
Guilds Full Technological Certificate, qualifications obtained from colleges of 
further education or from professional institutions below degree level but above 
GCE A-level standard 
DEGREE DEGREE includes: 
Higher degrees (Census Level A), first degree, university diploma or certificate, 
qualifications obtains from colleges of further education or from professional 
institutions of degree standard (Census Level B) 
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Table 1b: Recoding process of six education groups in the GHS 1972-2002 
Years Variable  NOQUAL Below O-LEVEL O-LEVEL A-LEVEL Higher Education Degree 
1972-1982 hedqual  (0=0)  (10/14=8) (7/9=11) (6=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no qual clerical & comm qual;  
cse other;  
apprenticeship; 
any foreign qual; 
other qual. 
gce'o'level-5 or more;  
gce'o'1-4,with c&c; 
gce'o' 1-4,no c&c 
gce'a'level, 
onc, 
ond 
teaching qual-non gr; 
hnc, hnd, tech cert; 
nursing qual.  
higher degrees 1st ; 
degree, univ. dip 
1983-1988 edlev  (16/20=0)  (11/15=8) (8/10=11) (6 7=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no quals; 
never went 
to school 
com qual no o levels;    
cse grades 2-5;  
apprenticeship;  
foreign quals; 
other qual. 
gce o level 5+; 
gce o lev1-4 & cq;  
gce o lev1-4 no cq 
gce a level 2+; 
gce a level 1 
teaching qual; 
other higher qual; 
nursing qual 
higher degree ; 
first degree 
1989-1998 edlev2  (8=0)  (5/7=8) (4=11) (3=12)  (2=14) (1=15) 
    none cse gra2-5 equiv; 
sg 6-7 no award; 
foreign, other 
gcse olev equiv gce alevel equiv <degree higher q degree or equiv 
2000-2002 edlev00  (-9 13=0)  (10/12=8) (8/9=11) (6 7=12)  (3/5=14) (1 2=15) 
    no qual cse below grade 1; 
gcse below grade c;  
apprenticeship;  
other qualification 
gcse/olevel,  
standard grades, 5+; 
gcse/olevel 1-4 
gce a level in two 
or more subjects; 
gce a level in 
one subject  
teaching qual; 
other higher qual; 
nursing qual 
higher degree; 
first degree 
Sources: The General Household Survey 1972-2002. 
Notes: Adapted from Table 5.1 in Schmitt (1995) and Code manuals of the General Household Survey 1972-2002 (ONS, 2004). Even with the same name, variables may 
change in definition and label value. For example, “edlev” in 1986 and 1987 is different since the latter year includes one more qualifications and changes the label values. 
Another example is that the “other qualification” in “edlev00” is not directly comparable with “other qualification” in previous GHS “edlev” output categories. It was not 
possible to separate foreign qualifications and other qualifications given the current set of questions. The foreign qualifications do not exist in the period 2000-2002. Even 
though these changes may affect the comparability between different time periods (jumps are found in the aggregate the NOQUAL group in 1983 and the OLEV group in 
1986), the consistency of this broad education categorization is satisfactory over the entire period. 
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Table 2: Calculation of weekly/hourly earnings variable 
Years 
Variable of  
Earnings 
Corresponding 
Working 
Weeks 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Weekly 
Working 
Hours 
Hourly 
Earnings 
1972-1978 incempx incempw 
incempx 
/incempw workhrs 
incempx 
/incempw 
/workhrs 
1979-1982 - - payweek workhrs 
payweek/ 
workhrs  
1983-1986 paygross payperd (perd) 
paygross 
/perd workhrs 
paygross 
/perd 
/workhrs 
1987-1991 - - uge workhrs 
uge 
/workhrs 
1992-1996 - - geind workhrs 
geind 
/workhrs 
1998-2002 - - grearn workhrs 
grearn 
/workhrs 
Sources: Code manuals of the General Household Surveys 1972-2002 (ONS, 2004).  
Note:  Definition of earnings variables in the GHS:  
Incempx:  Gross income from employment in last year. 
Incempw: No. weeks income from employment in last year. 
Workhrs:  No. hours worked per week in main job -excluding meals and overtime. 
Payweek: Gross weekly earnings from main job. 
Paygross: Gross pay of last time from main job before any deduction. 
Payperd (perd): Period covered by last wage or salaries, which is corresponding working weeks of 
paygross
11
. 
Uge: Usual gross weekly earnings from main job and other jobs. 
Geind: Usual gross weekly earnings from main job and second job. 
Grearn: Gross weekly earned income from main job and second job.  
 
For years 1972-1978, weekly earnings were derived from all earnings including wages, salaries, tips, 
bonus and commissions in all jobs held in the previous twelve months. For years 1979-1986, weekly 
earnings were estimated as the usual gross earnings including tips and bonuses per pay period from the 
worker’s main job, divided by the usual number of weeks covered in each pay period. In the 1987-2002 
surveys, weekly earnings include all income earned from the main job and other (or second) jobs. 
These changes may affect comparisons of earnings between different two periods, but no evident 
discontinuity is found. On the other hand, weekly earnings include payments for bonuses and overtime 
but the measurement of working hours per week excludes overtime which varies across individuals and 
over the business cycle. That implied that hourly earnings in this paper may suffer upwards bias, 
though the GHS is still consistent and comparable with the hourly earnings from other datasets.   
                                                 
11
 Perd is a variable derived by authors from payperd, according to rules: one calendar month = 4.3 
weeks, one quarter =13 weeks. 
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Table 3: Log Hourly Earnings Equations, GHS 1972-2002. Estimation from equation 
(1) 
A. Males (full time workers) 
  
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.1030*** 0.0851*** 0.0935*** 0.1152*** 0.1097*** 0.0870*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0099) (0.0147) (0.0229) 
OLEV 0.2123*** 0.1656*** 0.1863*** 0.2066*** 0.1664*** 0.1826*** 
  (0.0060) (0.0066) (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0124) (0.0203) 
ALEV 0.2986*** 0.2558*** 0.2927*** 0.3344*** 0.2922*** 0.2720*** 
  (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0135) (0.0210) 
HIGHER 0.4434*** 0.3589*** 0.4216*** 0.4478*** 0.3894*** 0.3999*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0099) (0.0102) (0.0140) (0.0227) 
DEGREE 0.6593*** 0.5602*** 0.5917*** 0.6683*** 0.6145*** 0.6810*** 
  (0.0104) (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0138) (0.0206) 
EXP 0.0432*** 0.0407*** 0.0481*** 0.0516*** 0.0481*** 0.0458*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
EXP2 -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MIDLAND 0.0169*** 0.0054 -0.0058 0.0238*** 0.0598*** 0.0158 
  (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0122) (0.0181) 
SOUTH 0.0677*** 0.0658*** 0.0953*** 0.1513*** 0.1696*** 0.1601*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0097) (0.0144) 
WALES -0.0059 -0.0265*** -0.0135 -0.0601*** -0.0488*** 0.0011 
  (0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0208) (0.0290) 
SCOTLAND 0.0062 -0.0005 0.0133 -0.0052 0.0014 0.0187 
  (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0153) (0.0228) 
WHITE 0.0506*** 0.0455*** 0.0648*** 0.1190*** 0.1218*** 0.0408* 
  (0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0135) (0.0149) (0.0199) (0.0261) 
MARRIED 0.2124*** 0.1830*** 0.1658*** 0.1671*** 0.1818*** 0.1063*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0121) (0.0158) 
y1 0.0662*** -0.0985*** -0.0501*** -0.0724*** -0.0289*** 0.0599*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0068) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0123) (0.0164) 
y2 0.1209*** -0.0810*** -0.0449*** 0.0005 -0.0480*** 0.0799*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0125) (0.0161) 
y3 0.1848*** 0.0026 -0.0450*** 0.0245*** 0.0053 0.1340*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0163) 
y4 0.1409*** 0.0541*** -0.0067 0.0382*** -0.0122 - 
  (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0127) - 
R
2
 0.3695 0.3160 0.3424 0.3707 0.2352 0.1926 
N 34,086 30,300 21,329 21,635 18,543 12,239 
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Continued 
 
 
B. Females (full time workers) 
 
1972- 
1976 
1977- 
1981 
1982- 
1986 
1987- 
1991 
1992- 
1996 
1998- 
2002 
BOLEV 0.1525*** 0.1208*** 0.1183*** 0.1460*** 0.1750*** 0.1517*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0193) (0.0299) 
OLEV 0.2293*** 0.1822*** 0.2259*** 0.2804*** 0.2392*** 0.2280*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0271) 
ALEV 0.3787*** 0.3345*** 0.3551*** 0.4331*** 0.3524*** 0.3326*** 
  (0.0180) (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.0156) (0.0199) (0.0278) 
HIGHER 0.4663*** 0.4490*** 0.4834*** 0.5864*** 0.5473*** 0.4588*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0143) (0.0159) (0.0148) (0.0195) (0.0291) 
DEGREE 0.7357*** 0.6720*** 0.6690*** 0.7679*** 0.7223*** 0.6799*** 
  (0.0270) (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0202) (0.0270) 
EXP 0.0356*** 0.0341*** 0.0424*** 0.0460*** 0.0447*** 0.0459*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0025) 
EXP2 -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
MIDLAND -0.0156 0.0129 -0.0239* -0.0036 0.0304** 0.0144 
  (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0125) (0.0164) (0.0224) 
SOUTH 0.1156*** 0.1014*** 0.1247*** 0.1746*** 0.1753*** 0.1643*** 
  (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0129) (0.0176) 
WALES -0.0244 -0.0311* 0.0019 -0.0661*** -0.0467* 0.0180 
  (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0226) (0.0206) (0.0268) (0.0349) 
SCOTLAND -0.0051 0.0069 0.0075 0.0122 0.0198 0.0524** 
  (0.0103) (0.0131) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0199) (0.0266) 
WHITE 0.0218 0.0085 0.0299 0.0194 0.0321 0.0726*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0176) (0.0228) (0.0280) 
MARRIED -0.0127 -0.0016 -0.0148 -0.0033 0.0266** -0.0243 
  (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0138) (0.0183) 
y1 0.0593*** -0.0116 0.0131 0.0679*** -0.0806*** 0.0695*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0135) (0.0127) (0.0163) (0.0200) 
y2 0.1569*** 0.0855*** 0.0094 0.1282*** -0.0406*** 0.0949*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0195) 
y3 0.2727*** 0.1396*** 0.0310** 0.1394*** -0.0096 0.1534*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0165) (0.0197) 
y4 0.2782*** 0.0905*** 0.0312** 0.1286*** 0.0065 - 
  (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0128) (0.0165) - 
R
2
 0.2786 0.2360 0.2660 0.3280 0.2136 0.1771 
N 12,833 11,891 9,440 11,501 10,496 7,459 
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Note: The numbers in the table represent the estimated coefficients and standard errors using the pooled GHS 
datasets of six periods: 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-91, 1992-96 and 1998-2002. Samples include 
full-time workers aged 16-66 years who were not self-employed and all hourly earnings numbers are deflated 
based on 1995 pounds. The dependent variable is log gross hourly pay. Explanatory variables include a vector 
of five education dummies (BOLEV, OLEV, ALEV, HIGHER and DEGREE, NOQUAL as the base group), 
the quadratic in experience (Exp and Exp
2
), four region dummies (MIDLAND, SOUTH, WALES and 
SCOTLAND, the North of England as the base group), an ethnicity dummy (WHITE), a marital status dummy 
(MARRIED) and a vector of year dummies. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests.  
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